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Introduction: How to Approach Meaning?
When the child was a child
It didn’t know that it was a child,
Everything was full of life,
And all life was one.
When the child was a child,
It had no opinion about anything,
Had no habits,
It often sat cross-legged,
Took off running,
Had a cowlick in its hair, 
and made no faces when photographed.
When the child was a child
It was the time for these questions:
Why am I me, and why not you?
Why am I here and why not there?
When did time begin and where the space ends?
Is life under the sun not just a dream?
Is what I see and hear and smell
Not just illusion of a world before the world?
Peter Handke, Song of Childhood [excerpt]
From: Wim Wenders, Der Himmel über Berlin
When a child is born, something remarkable happens. A parent or a caretaker 
can observe how new domains of meanings emerge in the course of child’s develop-
ment. The child seeks for the warmness of her mother’s body, she reacts to sound 
and light, she instinctively begins sucking when her mouth is touched. Selected 
environmental factors are transformed by the child’s body in the processes of self-
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regulation and self-sustaining. This is the moment when meaning-making (or in 
Evan Thompson’s words: sense-making) starts: a child makes sense of environ-
mental factors at the biological level. She creates her own Umwelt – the domain of 
environmental factors important for preservation and development of an organism. 
Simultaneously, the child experiences the world. The mother’s body is experienced 
as warm, father’s voice as pleasant, milk as sweet. The child experiences herself 
and she experiences being with the other. Being with the other, in turn, crucially 
involves emotions. One particularly unforgettable moment in the life of a parent 
is an illustration of this fact: when an infant starts to share her emotions in face-
to-face interactions. When mother smiles, the child smiles back. Embodied emo-
tions of the parent become meaningful to the child due to the process of affective 
attunement (Stern, 1985). These experiences give rise to child’s world of meaningful 
phenomena, or Lifeworld. The emergence of a Lifeworld is tantamount to the emer-
gence of the second level of meaning: the level of consciousness. Around the first 
year of life a widespread meaningful behavioral pattern emerges: the child starts to 
point intentionally (cf. Tomasello, 2008, Chapter 4). Either she wants her caretak-
ers to do something (imperative pointing) or she shares experiences and emotions 
(declarative pointing). Simultaneously, the child is able to make sense of an adult’s 
pointing and the adults’ gaze. In this context, a new scope of meaningful phenom-
ena emerges: pointing gestures. The child starts her second year of life with the 
capacity for understanding and producing different type of gestures – pantomime 
or iconic gestures. She can recognize an adult’s behavior as pantomime – she is able 
to imagine what is in the gesture. On the other hand, she bites, tilts her head, waves 
her hands and expects her caretaker to do the same. In this way the child enters the 
third level of meaning: signs. With time, a child’s gestures become conventionalized 
– she starts to adjust her gestures to her parents’ ones. Soon, iconic gestures lose 
their role in communication in favor of language. Namely, shortly after learning 
to use iconic and conventional gestures, the child starts to distinguish linguistic 
behavior and comprehend linguistic conventions: yet another (fourth) domain of 
meaningful phenomena. 
The specificity of child meaning-making – poetically described by Handke and 
more strictly characterized in terms of developmental psychology – delivers a par-
tial answer to the first of the questions addressed by cognitive semiotics: what is 
meaning. Meaning – in the context of cognitive semiotics – is characterized at the 
four levels exemplified above: the level of life, levels of consciousness, signs and 
language. 
One should not be misled by the above developmental description. The problem 
of meaning can be addressed also from an evolutionary perspective. Are great apes 
capable of meaning-making? What about dogs? Parrots? Dolphins? Can we – in any 
way – relate their functioning and behavior to a child’s? In other words, studies on 
meaning include research on various non-human meaning-making activities. For 
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instance, we observe various living creatures: earthworms and mosquitos, pigeons 
and sparrows, cats and dogs – each of these beings seeks for favorable conditions to 
survive and create its Umwelt. In this context one may ask (as biosemioticians do) 
if the establishment of an Umwelt is tantamount to meaning-making? If it is, what 
about the capacity for meaning-making at higher levels? 
The above issues and questions motivated the emergence of cognitive semiotics as 
a discipline devoted to theoretical and empirical studies on meaning and meaning-
making processes. I encountered the label “cognitive semiotics” for the first time in 
2011, submitting a paper for the 7th conference of the Nordic Association for Semi-
otic Studies. The leading topic of the conference was “Towards Cognitive Semiotics. 
A semiotic perspective on cognition – A cognitive perspective on semiosis.” The 
label was new, but not the key issues discussed. As the title of the conference sug-
gests, cognitive semiotics was initially seen as a discipline combining research in 
semiotics (focusing on signs and sign-systems as meaningful entities) and in cogni-
tive science (with particular emphasis on models of cognitive processes responsible 
for meaning-making activities). Such a combination was supposed to overcome the 
limitations of these two disciplines. Cognitive science – as seen by semioticians 
– lacked a proper conception of meaning. In addition, it ignored the specificity 
of various kinds of sign-vehicles. The task of semiotics was to provide a relevant 
notion of meaning and deliver conceptual tools for analyses of meanings. Semiotics, 
in turn, was considered a primarily theoretical discipline: autonomous in regard 
to other empirical fields of study. Accordingly, cognitive science was expected to 
supplement semiotic theories with empirical findings. Mutual cooperation between 
semioticians and cognitive scientists with particular emphasis on phenomenologi-
cal issues promised to provide an appropriate account of meaning. I must note at 
this point that cognitive semioticians referred to a non-standard view of cognitive 
science. Specifically, they stressed the role of direct experience present in percep-
tion and action, simultaneously rejecting the standard view on representations as 
amodal symbols.
The above initial remarks allow for the formulation of the main aim of the 
book: the presentation of the relatively new discipline of cognitive semiotics in its 
complexity and richness. First, I present – as faithfully as possible – the institution-
alized approach initiated by researchers of the so-called Lund school in cognitive 
semiotics. Cognitive semiotics, in this view, is seen as a transdisciplinary approach, 
taking a dynamic perspective on meaning, acknowledging validity of first-, second- 
and third-person approaches to meaning-making. In addition, the Lund school is 
strongly influenced by the phenomenological approach to mind, Gibsonian psy-
chology and the idea of embodiment as presented by Francesco Varela, Thompson 
and Eleanor Rosch (1991).
Such an approach to studies on meaning-making rests on a number of assump-
tions concerning the nature of mind (with particular emphasis on consciousness 
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and subjectivity), understanding of cognition, essence of signs and language. In 
the following chapters (Chapter 4, 6 and 7) I strive to elicit these assumptions and 
I assess their role in cognitive semiotic enterprise. This aim corresponds to the 
presentation of the first of the “ways to cognitive semiotics” mentioned in the title 
of the book. I use the label “phenomenologically-oriented path” in reference to this 
approach.
Handke’s poem running through Wenders’s movie Himmel über Berlin as well as 
the movie itself ideally illustrate the development of a child’s meaning-making. The 
spectator of the movie can observe the emergence of a rich Lifeworld of the child, 
specifically in contrast to adults’ (and angels’) Lifeworlds. Watching this movie (or 
rather relishing it), one appreciates the phenomenological dimension of studies on 
mind, cognition and meaning-making. However, just like one cannot exclusively 
focus on poetic descriptions of a childhood, one cannot also base studies on mean-
ings exclusively on the phenomenological perspective. Realizing this, I partially 
depart from the view on cognitive semiotics presented above. I stress the fact that 
our activity in the world, our engagements with objects and other subjects also have 
their functional aspects. For instance, adults’ gestures are meaningful to a child since 
they have certain functions: they are performed to draw the child’s attention, they 
are intended to evoke a response, their task is to inform the child. Parents’ gestures 
are meaningful to the child as far as she can imagine what she is supposed to do. 
Consequently, the second aim of the book is to validate the role of a functionalist, 
standard (“cognitivist”) cognitive science in studies on meaning and meaning-mak-
ing. This approach to meaning is considered the other “way to cognitive semiotics”. 
I call this approach “functionalist-cognitivist path” in cognitive semiotics. 
Cognitive semiotics in its early years – as mentioned above – has been developed 
in explicit contraposition to standard cognitive science. First, cognitive semioti-
cians stressed the role of subjectivity and consciousness in accounts of cognition. 
Cognition – in their view – should be seen as processes emerging in interactions 
between the brain, body and an environment. The body – it must be stressed – is 
not treated as an external tool of cognition, but as indispensable participant of 
cognitive processes. In this context analyses of the lived body crucially contribute 
to research on cognition. The initial reference to an enactive view on cognition – 
characteristic of early cognitive semiotics – has been replaced by commitment to 
an approach to cognition which is known as 4e cognitive science, combining ele-
ments of the enactive approach, embodied and embedded views on cognition, as 
well as an interpretation of the extended approach. This tension between standard 
cognitive science and non-standard approaches is present in discussions within the 
cognitive semiotic community. Although this tension also has its reflection in this 
book, I do not intend to stress differences between the approaches or to argue for 
one of the parties of the dispute. On the contrary, I attempt to relieve this tension. 
Although I have written the book from the cognitivist perspective, I try to convince 
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a cognitivist reader (and to a degree myself as well) that researchers working within 
the functionalist view on mind and standard cognitive science must accept the 
limitations of their own approach. Specifically, I argue that they should admit the 
necessity of complementary, non-functionalist approaches to the meaning-making 
mind. To achieve this goal, I elaborate in detail the phenomenological approach to 
mind. For the same reasons, I discuss the non-standard approaches to cognition 
thoroughly. On the other hand, I attempt to show that standard cognitive science 
constantly changes and develops. In particular, cognitive scientists became aware 
that inclusion of the body in considerations on cognition and appreciation of the 
role of specific environmental factors are necessary. The picture of cognitive sci-
ence as a discipline exclusively occupied with computational operations on amodal 
symbolic representations is no longer valid and reference to such a picture of cog-
nitive science may be treated as a straw-man argument. Ultimately, my final con-
clusion is that researchers should seek conciliatory solutions combining elements 
of standard cognitive science and non-standard approaches to cognition. Mark 
Rowlands’ (2010) idea of the amalgamated mind can be considered as such a unify-
ing approach. In this context, I would like to see cognitive semiotics as a possible 
platform for the rapprochement of standard and non-standard cognitive science 
in studies on meaning-making.
The presentation of cognitive semiotics would not be complete without reference 
to empirical studies on meaning-making activities. In addressing this empirical 
facet of cognitive semiotics, I focus and draw the reader’s attention primarily to 
one of the levels of meaning, namely the level of signs.1 In line with the so-called 
“conceptual-empirical loop” or “conceptual-empirical spiral” (Zlatev, 2011; Zlatev 
et al., 2016) I consider selected theories of signs as possible conceptual backgrounds 
of empirical research on semiosis. In particular, Charles S. Peirce’s and Göran Son-
esson’s theoretical findings are applied in empirical (primarily psychological and 
comparative) studies on the semiotic capacities of children and chimpanzees, as 
well as on the emergence and development of communication. While the combina-
tion of theory and empirical studies is widely accepted within cognitive semiotics, 
cognitive modeling is unusual or uncommon. The novelty of my approach consists 
in the application of cognitivist methods and, in particular, cognitive (computa-
tional) modeling in cognitive semiotics.2 Specifically, I use the Peircean triadic view 
on semiosis as the conceptual background for my model. 
1  Other levels are represented – to a degree – in the book as well. The empirical aspect of the 
level of life is partially characterized in the context of the enactivist approach to cognition (Chapter 
6), empirical studies in connection with the level of consciousness are partially addressed in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4.
2  The only explicit attempt to combine cognitive semiotics and cognitivism I am aware of has been 
presented by Joel Parthemore (e.g. 2016). Specifically, he justifies – at the theoretical level – the role 
of GOFAI (good, old-fashioned Artificial Intelligence) in cognitive semiotics. 
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Elaboration of the level of signs closes the presentation of cognitive semiotics. 
The detailed and systematic characteristics of the fourth level of meaning, the level 
of language – as characterized by normativity and conventionality (cf. section 2.2.6 
in Chapter 2) – is beyond the scope of this book. 
The book may seem a bit eclectic to the reader. While attempting to show various 
credentials of cognitive semiotics I discuss highly abstract problems of philosophy 
of mind and simultaneously present results of very specific experiments on picture 
recognition. On the one hand, I elaborate intentional acts involved in semiotic 
activity; on the other, I describe a computational system capable of a limited inter-
pretation of excerpts from Through the Looking-Glass novel. I look for meaning-
making in the behavior of E. coli bacteria and I characterize it in terms of Peircean 
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. However, this diversity of issues, 
topics and approaches reflects the nature of the discipline (cognitive semiotics) and 
its subject-matter (meaning-making). As a transdisciplinary approach to meaning 
and meaning-making, it necessarily draws on different disciplines: starting with 
philosophy of mind, via semiotics and linguistics, cognitive science(s), neuroan-
thropology, developmental and evolutionary psychology, comparative studies, and 
ending with robotics. What is more, I suggest including cognitive modeling in the 
list of disciplines. I am convinced that this list is not closed, and recent cognitive 
semiotic conferences confirm this observation. I can only hope that the reader will 
be able to find a consistent line of thought behind all these miscellaneous phe-
nomena, approaches and theories. To minimize the reader’s feeling of perplexity, 
I present “the roadmap” in the organization of the book. 
The book is organized into four parts, as they are summarized below. In general, 
each of the parts (apart from the first one) characterizes a level of discussions on 
meaning: mind as a meaning-making system, meaning-making as a cognitive pro-
cess and finally, meaning-making as a semiotic3 phenomenon. Furthermore, each 
of these parts splits into two chapters: each of these chapters, roughly, presents one 
of the two ways to cognitive semiotics, either functional-cognitivist (Chapters 3, 5, 8) 
or phenomenologically-oriented (Chapters 4, 6, 7). 
Part I presents cognitive semiotics as a consciously developed discipline focus-
ing on the phenomenon of meaning and meaning-making processes. Chapter 1 
summarizes initial attempts to define cognitive semiotics as well as its background 
and related work. I enumerate key features of the discipline and discuss controver-
sial assumptions (the leading role of phenomenology and the commitment to enac-
tive cognitive science). Chapter 2 clarifies the subject-matter of cognitive semiotics, 
namely the notion of meaning. Specifically, I present the Semiotic Hierarchy frame-
work discussing the notion of meaning in both evolutionary and developmental 
perspectives. The Semiotic Hierarchy is seen as a uniform framework facilitating the 
3  “Semiotic” in traditional or narrow sense of this term, i.e. sign-based. Cf. section 1.2, below.
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defragmentation (to use Zlatev’s phrase) and unification of the notion of meaning. 
The chapter closes with suggestions concerning revisions of the Semiotic Hierarchy.
Part II is devoted to the philosophical background of cognitive semiotics and 
can be seen as addressing the question: what is the meaning-making mind. From 
Chapter 3, the cognitive semiotic story splits into two seemingly unrelated, but 
actually overlapping plots: functionally- and phenomenologically-oriented. In 
Chapter 3 I consider the “analytic” philosophy of mind as a foundation of cog-
nitivist studies on meaning. The label “analytic” is taken broadly4 and embraces 
both the functionalist approach as well as Nagel’s view on the subjective mind. The 
description of the functional approach to mind is preceded by a presentation of the 
theoretical ancestors of functionalism, namely behaviorism and identity theory. 
The detailed presentation of behaviorism is not accidental as the enactive approach 
to cognition is sometimes referred to as a neobehavioristic approach. Chapter 4, 
in turn, characterizes phenomenology as a first step on the non-cognitivist way 
to cognitive semiotics. Phenomenology is shown as providing tools for analyses 
of meaningful phenomena and delivering crucial notions for studies on mean-
ings (intentionality, embodiment, Lifeworld, among others). Specifically, I elabo-
rate the role of phenomenology in studies on perceptual, sign-based and linguistic 
meaning-making. In line with the postulate to combine conceptual and empirical 
approaches, example applications of phenomenology in empirical studies on mean-
ings are presented as well. 
Part III attempts to answer the question: how to account for cognition. As I men-
tioned above, cognitive science is considered one of the disciplines contributing to 
cognitive semiotics. It is understandable in the context of the commitment to the 
claim that meaning-making is treated as an instance of cognitive processes. The 
objections formulated in reference to standard cognitive science raise the question 
of possible alternative approaches to cognition. As the view on cognition depends 
on the view on mind, the “split story” of cognitive semiotics continues. Chapter 
5 should be read in connection with Chapter 3: the standard, functional view on 
cognition is presented and discussed. I focus on these aspects of standard cognitive 
science which give rise to objections in the context of cognitive semiotics; namely 
the notions of representation, brain-boundedness, and computation. Simultane-
ously, I attempt to suggest the possible role of standard cognitive science in research 
on meanings. This chapter closes with a presentation of the putative third stage in 
the development of cognitive science (Thompson, 2007a), namely the dynamic 
systems theory. 
Chapter 6, in turn, should be seen – to a degree – as a continuation of issues pre-
sented in Chapter 4: various non-standard approaches to cognition are discussed. 
4  In fact, I use the term in the manner in which phenomenologically-oriented cognitive semioti-
cians do. “Analytic” in this context means “non-phenomenological.”
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In subsequent sections I present enactive, embodied, embedded and extended 
approaches, simultaneously discussing their phenomenological leanings and puta-
tive role in cognitive semiotics. Specifically, I focus on mind–body–environment 
interactions, the scope of cognitive processes to be accounted for and on the role of 
representations in meaning-making activities. This chapter closes with two sections 
summarizing discussions on cognition. Section 6.6 suggests a conciliatory approach 
to cognition. The idea of the amalgamated mind is intended to unify representation-
alist and computational approaches to cognition on the one hand, and phenom-
enologically motivated stances on the other hand. Section 6.8, in turn, attempts to 
comparatively assess standard cognitive science and non-standard approaches in 
the context of cognitive semiotics. 
Part IV of the book delves into one, specific level of meaning; namely the third 
level in the Semiotic Hierarchy, the level of signs. Accordingly, Chapter 7 introduces 
the very notion of a sign (in terms of the Stoics theory of semeia). Since cognitive 
semiotics focuses on dynamic meaning-making and relationships between semiosis 
and cognition, I introduce the Peircean theory of signs. Finally, the phenomeno-
logically and empirically motivated Sonesson’s theory (I dubbed it “semiotics for 
cognitive semiotics”) is presented. In this context, the affinities between semiotics 
and phenomenology are discussed. The second part of Chapter 7 presents “the 
conceptual-empirical spiral” in action; namely I show how semiotic studies on 
the one hand, and empirical research on the emergence of “semiotic function,” the 
emergence of communication and sensitivity to various kinds of sign-vehicles on 
the other, are combined.
Chapter 8 can be seen as the continuation of Chapter 5 as it introduces a specific 
methodology developed within standard cognitive science, namely cognitive mod-
eling. I elaborate the features of cognitive models and the criteria of their assess-
ment. The notion of cognitive architecture as a framework facilitating the design 
of cognitive models is presented as well. In the second part of Chapter 8, I refer to 
results of my own research in cognitive semiotics. I elaborate my model of semiosis 
which draws on the Peircean theory of signs. I also argue that such an approach 
complements first-person methods and I speculate that it can be combined with 
results of phenomenological studies. Chapter 8 closes the “functional-cognitivist” 
path to cognitive semiotics.
In the final, concluding part, I return to the initial characteristics of cognitive 
semiotics and I attempt to assess it in the light of contemporary studies on meaning-
making. I take the bird’s eye view of the two ways to cognitive semiotics and their 
interrelations. Finally, I speculate about possible future tenets of cognitive semiotic 
research with particular emphasis on the putative role of computational modeling 
in studies on semiosis. 
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Chapter 1
Introducing Cognitive Semiotics
1.1 The beginnings
In 2016 (Zlatev, Sonesson & Konderak, 2016, p. 9), we optimistically announced: 
“Cognitive semiotics can hardly be characterized as an ‘emerging’ discipline any-
more. It is already here.” Looking at the discipline from an institutional point of 
view it is hard to deny it: cognitive semioticians can join an association (Interna-
tional Association for Cognitive Semiotics, IACS, founded 2013), they can meet 
during international conferences of the association (two of them took place in 2014 
in Lund and in 2016 in Lublin, the next one will take place in Toronto, in 2018), 
they can publish in a dedicated journal (Cognitive Semiotics published by de Gruyter 
Mouton). Cognitive semiotics is also an established field of studies at the University 
of Aarhus, University of Lund as well as Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in 
Lublin and University of Białystok. Leaving the above institutional criteria aside, 
I wish to answer the question: what is cognitive semiotics as a scientific discipline? 
Let us start with the origins of this discipline. Historically, cognitive semiotics 
emerged as a research program bringing together research results of semiotics, 
linguistics and cognitive science(s). The basic idea behind the program was to inte-
grate humanities, social sciences and natural sciences in their efforts to describe 
properly and explain the phenomenon of meaning and meaning-making processes. 
Meaning seems to be (regardless its particular definition) a phenomenon that is 
present in multiple areas of study. Three disciplines are particularly interested in 
the phenomenon: philosophy (especially philosophy of language and mind) with 
Fregean notions of sense and reference or the Putnamian problem of the meaning of 
meaning (1975), semiotics (with meaning of signs) and linguistics (with semantics 
and pragmatics of linguistic units). Consequently, meaning has been extensively 
studied in the humanities and these disciplines have provided a solid conceptual 
basis for a theory of meaning. However, meaning is not (only) an abstract con-
cept or idea – human beings in their everyday functioning treat various aspects of 
their world as meaningful: they make sense of their surroundings (in interpreting 
various objects and phenomena), they also communicate about these meaningful 
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aspects. Interpretation and communication may be successful or may fail – for dif-
ferent reasons. To identify some of these reasons it is necessary to enrich the area 
of humanities and approach human beings as subjects of experimental studies. 
Accordingly, psychology and neuroscience enter the stage: studies on meanings 
and meaning-making gained their empirical dimension. 
In the late 1950s, a new discipline, cognitive science, emerged and provided 
a (more-less) uniform framework for studies on human cognition. Although it would 
be an overstatement to claim that cognitive science integrated the mentioned above 
disciplines in studies of meaning, one can safely state that cognitive science – interested 
in communication, language use and understanding – also provided a kind of ground 
for studies on meaning-making activities.5 However, cognitive science, at least in its 
cognitivist form,6 dissatisfied researchers interested in meanings. As Sonesson (2009, 
p. 28) states: “cognitive science – as a study of mind – either ignored the phenomenon 
of meaning or described it improperly.” Specifically, cognitive science – in the eyes 
of the early cognitive semioticians – misses one crucial aspect of our mentality and 
cognition, namely consciousness (understood as experience). Regardless of the valid-
ity of the accusation (cf. Chapter 5), the motivation for such a complaint is obvious: 
researchers initiating studies on meaning consider consciousness “as the primary 
source of meaning” (Chalmers as quoted by Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 108, cf. 
also: Chalmers, 1997, p. 21). This conviction directed the attention of researchers 
toward consciousness studies on the one hand, and alternative approaches to cogni-
tion (enactive, embodied, embedded and extended) on the other hand.
As mentioned above, it is natural to look for meanings in a discipline concerned 
with signs, in semiotics. Semioticians offered various explanations of meaningful-
ness, based on, e.g. proximity, similarity, conventions (to use the currently most 
popular distinction). The problem was that semiotic theories became “stuck between 
the analysis of single texts and theory construction” (Sonesson, 2009, p. 36) and 
they ignored results of empirical research. Cognitive semiotics is seen as a remedy 
to the situation: it is intended to combine theory construction and experimental 
work characteristic for studies on cognition. In addition, the subject of cognitive 
semiotics research started to be analyzed in evolutionary as well as developmental 
perspectives (Donald, 1991; Christiansen and Kirby 2003b; Tomasello et al., 2003; 
Tomasello, 2008).
The very idea of cognitive semiotics, understood as a research project combining 
research in semiotics and in cognitive science, emerged in the nineties of the twen-
5  I take cognitive science to be interested primarily in cognitive processes, hence reference to 
meaning-making (understood as a process) rather than to, e.g. meaning structures (implying a rather 
static dimension).
6  I use the label “cognitivist” in reference to the standard, representationalist and computational-
ist: symbolic and connectionist cognitive science. The distinction between “Cartesian,” “cognitivist” 
cognitive science and “non-Cartesian” approaches to cognition will be elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6.
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tieth century. It was Thomas Daddesio (1995) who suggested “a cognitive theory of 
symbols” and opted for “a cognitive approach to semiosis.” Daddesio postulates an 
integration of traditional semiotics – understood as the study of the relationship 
between signs (“symbols” in Daddesio’s words) and their meanings on the one hand, 
and cognitive science – understood in this context as an empirical study on cognitive 
processes responsible for access to such signs on the other. Especially, Daddesio is 
interested in the way in which signs became available for consciousness. The approach 
– initially sketched by Daddesio – evolved and crystallized during the years of intel-
lectual activity of researchers at end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.
The name of the discipline is somewhat misleading, as it suggests that it deals 
with a combination of research on cognition and semiotic-related problems. The 
grammatical construction of the label “cognitive semiotics”, in turn, may suggest 
that the field of study constitutes one more sub-discipline within cognitive science 
(by analogy to: cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience or cognitive anthro-
pology). It is Umberto Eco, who noticed such possibility in his paper “Semiotics in 
the Next Millennium” (1999):
 No one in the United States has ever claimed that the cognitive sciences are a single science, and 
everyone is in agreement about maintaining them as a sort of interdisciplinary aggregate with 
a common nucleus. And it does not displease me that semiotics has come to be included in this 
confederation, independently of the question (still debated) whether semiotics is a cognitive sci-
ence or cognitive sciences are a branch of semiotics. 
On the other hand, the label may suggest that cognitive semiotics should be 
treated as a new “branch” in semiotics – on a par with, e.g. “anthroposemiotics,” 
“semiotics of culture,” or particular semiotic theory, e.g. “Peircean semiotics” 
(Zlatev, 2012, p. 2). None of these interpretations gives justice to contemporary 
studies on meanings, to cognitive semiotics. The idea behind the label is a bit more 
complex and requires more detailed elaboration. 
Jordan Zlatev (2011; 2012; 2015) attempted to formulate a definition of cognitive 
semiotics. There are two oft-quoted characteristics of the discipline, the first one 
referring primarily to the subject-matter of the discipline, the second one character-
izing cognitive semiotics in terms of contributing disciplines, namely:
Cognitive semiotics can be defined as an interdisciplinary matrix of (sub-parts of) disciplines and 
methods, focused on the multifaceted phenomenon of meaning. (Zlatev, 2011)
Cognitive semiotics aims at “integrating methods and theories developed in the disciplines of cogni-
tive science with methods and theories developed in semiotics and the humanities, with the ultimate 
aim of providing new insights into the realm of human signification and its manifestation in cultural 
practices.” (Editorial Preface, Cognitive Semiotics Issue 0 (2007) quoted by Zlatev, (2012, p. 2))
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The two definitions, taken together, indicate the subject matter of cognitive 
semiotics (meaning), its methodology (result of integration methodologies of scien-
ces and humanities) and highlight the transdisciplinarity of the field of study. In 
the following sections, I initially present the subject-matter of cognitive semiotics 
(a more detailed presentation is forthcoming in the second chapter), methodology 
and “matrix of disciplines” contributing cognitive semiotics. 
1.2 Extension of the term “semiotics”
The reader may be familiar with some definitions of semiotics where the 
notions of a sign and a sign system play a crucial role. Semiotics is usually defined 
as “a theory of signs” (Żegleń, 2000, p. 13) or as a discipline which studies various 
sign systems (Żegleń, 2000, p. 18). In a similar vein, Daniel Chandler (2007, p. 1) 
writes: “The shortest definition is that it is the study of signs.” Even if we admit that 
the actual meanings of the above definitions ultimately depend on understanding 
of the notion of “sign,”7 we still discuss a discipline limited to a particular (although 
broad8) class of entities called signs and understood as “anything which stands for 
something else.” 
To understand the subject matter of cognitive semiotics, the reader has to real-
ize that the meaning of the term “semiotics” in the name of the discipline has been 
significantly broadened. Cognitive semioticians focus on meanings and meaning-
making in general and define semiotics accordingly. Signs are considered just a sub-
class of all possible meaningful phenomena; the usage and interpretation of signs 
are just one of possible kinds of meaning-making activity. In line with these con-
siderations, Lorraine McCune (2016, p. 127) writes: “Under [the extended defini-
tion of semiotics – P.K.], favored by many in cognitive semiotics, all experience of 
meaning (even sensation) can be considered semiotic (i.e. meaningful), but only 
some special kinds of meanings are signs.” To illustrate the above statement let us 
have a  look at some examples of meaningful phenomena and meaning-making 
activities. When E. coli bacteria moves in water environment towards sugar-rich 
region, it makes sense of its environment. In other words, sugar-rich water is mean-
ingful for the bacteria. When an animal avoids too hot (or sunny) regions, it makes 
sense of the perceived stimuli. In other words, temperature (as experienced by the 
animal) is meaningful for this animal. If a toddler reacts to eye movement of her 
parent or caretaker and follows the gaze, she makes sense of bodily actions. The 
7  Sonesson sees here the main problem of traditional semiotics: there is no specific definition of 
the sign which would allow to “separate meanings which are signs from other meanings” (Sonesson, 
2007, p. 92).
8  In line with Eco (1976, p. 7), echoing Peirce, writing: “everything can be taken as a sign.” 
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gaze is meaningful for her. If a driver stops at the red light at a junction, he makes 
sense of a (conventional) sign, this sign is meaningful for him. Finally, the reader 
of this book tries to make sense of the words printed on the sheet of paper. These 
words, sentences, paragraphs are meaningful to the reader. All the examples show 
diversity of possible meaning-making activities and different ways to understand 
the phenomenon of meaning. Cognitive semioticians argue that one cannot limit 
the class of meaningful phenomena just to signs and language – the scope of mean-
ing is much broader. One of the goals of cognitive semiotics is to identify classes of 
possible meanings, characterize them and put them in evolutionary and develop-
mental frameworks. In particular, the so-called Lund school in semiotics accepts 
the hypothesis concerning hierarchy of meanings, the Semiotic Hierarchy frame-
work (Zlatev, 2009). This proposal is a subject of the next chapter. Simultaneously, 
cognitive semiotics avoids (over-)using the term “sign” in reference to all the above 
phenomena. A sign exemplifies just one kind of meaning and cannot be equated 
with meaning. Presence or concentration of sucrose is not a sign, although it is 
meaningful. In sum, cognitive semioticians suggest that it is necessary to focus 
on meaning and meaning-making activities in general (i.e. semiosis) rather than 
exclusively on signs and sign systems. 
What distinguishes cognitive semiotics from (at least some) approaches within 
traditionally understood semiotics is focus on the meaning dynamism. It means 
that meaning is seen not as a static phenomenon (e.g. a fixed result of the process 
of interpretation), but as a process (e.g. of constant reinterpretation). “Dynamic” 
means that researchers are interested in change of meaning rather than in some 
“snapshot,” particular meaning at particular time. Language, for instance, is not 
seen as ready-to-analyze complete phenomenon, but rather as a process, where 
semantics, pragmatics as well as grammatical structures change due to various 
individual, social and environmental factors. Dynamicity of meaning can be con-
sidered at different time-scales – in dependence of the phenomenon discussed. 
On the one hand, our perceptual meaningful experiences may change in (mili)
seconds (and that fact is reflected in relevant neuroscientific research techniques), 
on the other hand, language change may require years or even centuries. One 
of the leading ideas of cognitive semiotics is to describe and explain this dyna-
micity. Dynamicity of meanings is also a consequence of a specific approach to 
a meaning-making subject. Cognitive semiotics is interested in subjects active 
in their respective environments (Umwelt, Lifeworld: cf. Chapter 2). In this view, 
meaning-making subject cannot be considered a passive information-receiver, 
but an active information-seeker. The feature is stressed in enactive approach to 
cognition and elaborated in Chapter 6.
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